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Abstract
This article examines the role of family and the state in relation to the
living standards of the elderly in East Asia. It tries to test whether
familial arrangement according to Confucian ethics, which are still taken
seriously in East Asia, secures the minimum standards of living for the
elderly. This article, first, examines the social policy institutions for the
elderly in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It argues that public policy in
the region assumes the family as primarily responsible for elderly
people’s living standards. Secondly, this article analyses private and
public income transfers to elderly households, based on micro-data sets
for South Korea and Taiwan. It argues that private transfers do make
important contributions to the income of the elderly households,
particularly poorer households, while public transfers do not make any
significant impact. This suggests that Confucian ethics are still working.
Private transfers, however, fail to secure the minimum standards of
living of the elderly. The elderly households are far more prone to
poverty. The findings of this paper support the case for state action to
protect the living standards of the elderly in East Asia.1
I.  The East Asian Welfare Model and Asian Values
The aim of this article is to examine the role of the family and the state in
relation to the living standards of the elderly in East Asia. In this region
the Confucian principle, a central contour of Asian values, which
contends that the family takes better care of the elderly than the state, is
still taken seriously by citizens, and policy makers in particular. This
article will try to test the Confucian ethics by analysing the extent to
which private and public transfers contribute to the income of elderly
households. Through this analysis, it will seek to compare the welfare
mix of family and the state for the elderly among the East Asian
countries. In the wake of the emergence of ageing societies in East Asia,
this article will attempt to suggest the right mix of family and the state in
social welfare for the elderly. This article covers Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan, although, due to the inaccessibility to the Japanese micro-data,
the analysis of income transfers will be confined to South Korea and
Taiwan.
Bearing in mind the East Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s,
the relationship between East Asian values and economic success in the
region seems less of a fascinating question than it used to be.
Nevertheless students of comparative social policy have been engaged
in the debates as to what extent Asian values, notably Confucian ethics,
have influenced welfare regimes in East Asia. This debate has elicited
not only academic interest but policy implications since East Asian
countries will be facing increasing pressures of welfare demand while
due to the economic crisis the state finds it much harder to allocate
increasing financial resources to social welfare. In particular, East Asian
societies have witnessed a sharp increase in their elderly population,
which will increase the strain on welfare provision within the society.
If a social arrangement in accordance with Confucian ethics can
secure a minimum level of living standards for the elderly, it would
open up a wide range of policy options to the governments in the
region. If, on the contrary, Confucian ethics are mere political rhetoric,
East Asian societies would be better off facing the hard reality and being
prepared for social challenges arising from the increase in the elderly
population.
In her pioneering study, Jones argues that societies in East Asia,
particularly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore,
together make up their own brand of welfare state (Jones 1993: 199). She
goes on to say that Confucianism is placed at the heart of their welfare2
states with its values of hierarchy, duty, compliance, consensus, order,
harmony, stability and staying in power (Jones 1993: 202).
In contrast, a body of literature seems to disagree with Jones’
contention. Goodman and White strongly oppose Jones’ cultural
explanation. They argue that:
‘Cultural’ explanations in terms of Confucianism and the
like, whether indigenous or foreign, are unhelpful in our
attempts to understand the evolution of East Asian welfare
systems. When measured against strategic impact of basic
political, economic and demographic factors, ‘culture’, as
presently portrayed at least, proved to be of residual
explanatory value (Goodman and White 1998: 15).
In his comparative and historical analysis of East Asian welfare regimes,
Kwon concludes that East Asian societies, notably Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan, form a cluster of welfare regimes, distinctive from their
European counterparts.1 Contrary to Jones’ contention, he also argues
that Confucian ethics play only a minor part in the structuring of the
welfare state (Kwon 1998a). He points out four characteristics which
East Asian welfare states share (Kwon 1998a: 66).
First, the role of the state in the financing of social welfare is
largely that of regulator rather than provider.2 Instead of state agencies,
quasi-governmental bodies manage the various funds to which social
welfare contributions are made. This financial and institutional
arrangement is strongly related to developmentalism, which sees social
welfare policy as a subordinate part of economic strategy.
Secondly, this method of financing social welfare has resulted in a
fragmented welfare system in which the pooling of risk is narrower than
in an integrated system.
Thirdly, the redistributive outcomes of social policy in East Asia
differ from those in countries in the West such as Britain. The
distribution of market and disposable incomes in Japan and South Korea
                                 
1 Kwon’s comparative study actually covers Singapore and Hong Kong as well,
but his study suggests that the welfare states in Singapore and Hong Kong are
further away from the cluster of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Kwon 1998).
2  The state is a provider whereby the state itself delivers social policy
programmes which are then paid for through government expenditure. In
contrast, under the arrangement of the state as a regulator, the delivery of
social welfare programmes may be private although not voluntary, and the
costs of social welfare programmes are met by quasi-governmental agencies.
See Kwon (1997).3
is more equal than in Britain. (The Japanese data here represents the
income distribution of workers’ households only. Therefore, income
distribution of the entire households can be more unequal (Kwon 1997:
472).) Social policy intervention in Britain, however, is more
redistributive than in Japan and South Korea where the better off get the
lion’s share of social policy benefits (Kwon 1997: 472-476).
Last, but not least, the political battles behind the welfare systems
in East Asia have been largely dominated by conservative political
factors. Most of their welfare initiatives were brought about as an effort
to legitimise a conservative monopoly of political power.
Other studies, which deal with individual East Asian societies,
successfully explained the development of the welfare state without
much resort to Confucian ethics. Shinkawa and Pempel (1997) attributed
the minimalist Japanese welfare state to the conservative government’s
political strategy for its grip on power and big business interest in
controlling labour. Ku (1997) and Kwon (1998b) also explained the
development of the Taiwanese and Korean welfare systems in terms of
legitimisation of authoritarian governments and the necessity for
economic development.
Do these research outcomes suggest that Confucian ethics have not
played any significant role in the forming of the welfare state? The
authors of the above mentioned literature paid attention to the
institutional development of the welfare state, and they tried to find
explanatory variables, which positively influenced the development of
welfare institutions. Focusing only on institutional development,
however, cannot capture the complete dynamism of the welfare state, in
particular with respect to the Confucian influence. Since Confucianism
sees state intervention in the area of welfare as negative, if not
disturbing, to family duties, and social harmony, Confucian ethics might
exercise a retarding influence on the introduction of state-sponsored
social welfare programmes. For instance, the underdevelopment of day-
care services for children and the elderly in the East Asian welfare states
might be due to negative influences from Confucian ethics. According to
a strict interpretation of Confucian ethics, childcare and the care of aged
parents are regarded as basic responsibilities of the family and women
in particular. For this reason, we need to see the condition of social
welfare from the perspective of welfare mix, in order to understand the
dynamics of the welfare state and the influence of Confucianism.4
II.  The Welfare Mix for the Elderly
In the area of welfare for the elderly, Confucian ethics teach younger
generations to respect and support their elderly parents, which is one of
the central tenets of Confucian ethics. If one follows this ethics, one
would bring up children, support their education and help them to find
jobs, while one is working. After retirement, then, one can rely on the
support of one’s children for the rest of one’s life. If this proposition
holds, state sponsored income maintenance programmes in East Asian
societies need not be on the same scale as one might expect, since the
burden of an ageing population in the East Asian societies would be
shared by the state and the family. The question, however, remains
open, whether the hypothesis of this Confucian principle is actually
verified. In Section III we will test this hypothesis by an analysis of
private income transfers to elderly households. If family support for the
elderly is substantial to the extent that it alleviates poverty in old age,
we can conclude that the Confucian proposition is upheld. Before we
proceed to this analysis, it is necessary to look into the existing welfare
mix for the elderly.
At the outset, we need to make clear our understanding of
Confucian ethics in this paper before we proceed. We do not probe into
its richness in philosophical thoughts, but only understand it narrowly
in the sense that it teaches people to support their elderly parents. For
this reason, this paper does not claim that Confucianism is unique in
emphasising filial piety. Rather, it sees Confucianism as an East Asian
version of the moral tenet of filial piety, which can be seen in other
societies, such as Catholicism and Islam belief.
II.1  Public Pensions for the Elderly
In 1995 the proportion of the elderly population (65 years old and over3)
was 11.9% in Japan, 5.9% in South Korea and 7.6% in Taiwan, which was
still smaller than in other OECD countries, such as the USA (12.6%) and
Sweden (17.4%) (United Nations 1997). In the year 2020, 25.2% of the
population of Japan will be elderly, one of the highest proportions of
elderly population in the world. With respect to South Korea, the figure
will be 7.1% in the year 2000 and 13.2% in 2020. In other words, South
Korea will become an ‘ageing society’ in the year 2000. The situation in
Taiwan is not different. In the year 2021, Taiwan’s elderly population
                                 
3  Readers are advised to notice that this article sometimes refers to the elderly
as persons aged 60 or over due to the varying definitions of statistical sources.5
will be 14.1% of the whole population (DGBAS 1997a). Despite the
varying degrees of ageing, these three societies are facing the social
challenges of an ageing society.
JAPAN
Old age pension schemes must be the front line policy to deal with the
challenges of an ageing society, as well as social services and health care.
The public pension system in Japan is the most developed among the
three East Asian countries. It comprises the first-tier National Pension
Scheme, which guarantees to all citizens basic pensions, and the second-
tier Employees’ Pension, Mutual Aid Pension and National Pension
Fund schemes (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1995: 286). The second-
tier pension schemes provide pensions, which are supplementary to the
National Pension. These supplements are earnings-related. For the self-
employed, the National Pension Funds were established in 1991 to
supplement the basic pension. It also has different sub-programmes (see
Table 1). In 1995, 69.5 million that people paid contributions to the
National Pension and there were 16.1 million pensioners, which means
entitlement to pensions is firmly established in Japan.
Table 1: Public pension schemes in Japan








Employees’ Pension Private salaried workers The State
National Public Service
MAA
National Public Service MAA
Local Public Service
MAA
Local Public Service MAA
Private Teachers MAA Private Teachers MAA
Agricultural and forestry
MAA






Community type Self-employed Community
funds






Note: MAA= Mutual Aid Association
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1995)6
KOREA
The public pension system in Korea comprises the National Pension
Programme for ordinary citizens, the Public Employees’ Pension for
government employees, the Private School Teachers’ Pension for private
school teachers and the Veterans’ Pension Programme for retired
soldiers. Since the Public Employees’ Pension, the Private School
Teachers’ Pension and the Veterans’ Pension Programme are for specific
groups of people, the number of pensioners within these programmes
was small and stable. Of these public pension programmes, the National
Pension Programme is the main pension programme for most Korean
people. When it was introduced in 1988, it started with those employed
in work places with more than ten employees. The National Pension
Programme has expanded its coverage over the years and began to
cover the entire working population in April 1999 (Kwon 1999).4 One
should, however, bear in mind that it is a funded pension programme in
contrast to a pay-as-you-go scheme. In other words, it does not hand out
pensions to those who have not paid contributions beforehand, even if
they are already in their old age. It requires a twenty-year contribution
to be eligible for full pensions and fifteen years for partial pensions. For
those who cannot pay contributions for that length of time before their
retirement, there are two options: lump-sum payment and a special
pension. The lump-sum payment consists of all the money one has paid
plus a certain rate of interest while the special pension is a certain
proportion of the full pension according to the number of years of
contributions.
In a nutshell, since the National Pension Programme was
introduced in 1988, and its coverage gradually expanded over the years,
most of those who have already reached or will reach pensionable age in
the near future would not be eligible to pensions under the present
system. Table 2 shows that only 13.7% of elderly people received
pensions from various programmes in 1995. These figures will remain
stable until the year 2002 when the first group of people who joined the
National Pension Programme in 1988 will be eligible for partial
pensions. Even then, the number of people who are entitled to receive
pensions will be small. Since in 1995 the whole public pension systems
covered only 41.9% of working population, less than half of the elderly
will be entitled to public pensions in 2015.
                                 
4  Of course, it does not include people within other programmes, i.e., the Public
Employees’ Pension and the Private School Teachers’ Pension7




















10% 1.45% 2.1% 0.15% 13.7%
Note: *Number of special old age pensioners
Source: MoHW (1997), Yearbook of Health and Welfare Statistics
TAIWAN
Compared to Japan and South Korea, Taiwan has not yet introduced a
national pension programme for ordinary citizens, although Labour
Insurance, Government Employees’ Insurance and Insurance for Private
School Teachers and Staff cover 54% of the population aged between 15-
64. Despite the lack of a nation-wide public pension programme, Labour
Insurance is now fully matured and is paying retirement benefits, and
there are also Farmers’ Old Age Allowances. The number of persons
receiving pensions or allowances from these schemes is 27.5 per cent of
the elderly population aged 65 or over. Some city and county
governments, including Taipei, Ilan, Hsinchu, Tainan, Chiayi,
Kaoshiiung and Penghu, provide old-age allowances ranging from NT$
3,520  (£54.3) to NT$ 7,040 (£108.6) per month.5
At present, Taiwan is engaged in a political debate on what form
of National Pension Programme should be introduced. The debates are
becoming intensified as the presidential election in the year 2000 is
approaching (Ku 1998). The opposition Democratic Progressive Party
has already successfully utilised social policy issues such as National
Health Insurance in the previous elections (Kwon 1998a). The National
Pension Programme in Taiwan will, according to the Council for
Economic Planning Board’s planning report (CEPB 1995), be a funded
scheme, requiring a forty-year contribution for a full level of pension.
People who pay contributions for between 10 to 40 years can claim a
reduced pension only, minus 2.5% of the full pension per year.
                                 
5 http://www.gio.tw/info/yb97/ch19_5.htm8
From the discussion so far, it can be seen that most of the elderly
population (86.3%) in Korea and about 70 per cent of the elderly
population in Taiwan, do not have access to public pensions, while
65.6% of Japanese elderly people receive pensions.6 The Taiwanese
government has promised that a benefit of NT$2,000 (£30.8) monthly
will be paid to people aged 65 and over when NPI begins (Ku 1998: 40).
In Korea, the 1989 amendment of the Welfare Law for the Elderly
introduced an old-age allowance programme for those elderly over 70
who were officially defined as poor. This programme of allowances was
implemented from 1991 and in 1993 began to provide a pension to those
over 65 as well. In 1997, elderly people aged 65 to 79 received Won
35,000 (£17.9) and Won 50,000 (£25.6) for those over 80. This allowance
programme does not require contributions to be eligible, but it
specifically targets the old aged people who are identified as poor by the
Public Assistance Programme under the Livelihood Protection Law. The
expenditure allocated for the old-age allowance programme was 0.13%
of General Government Expenditure, 65% of which was borne by the
central government and the rest by the local governments.7 In 1997, the
number of people who received allowances under this scheme was
266,000, which was about 10% of all the people aged over 65.
To what extent does this allowance alleviate poverty among the
elderly people? Old age allowance does not secure a minimum level of
income, even in absolute terms. According to the Ministry of Health and
Welfare, the average minimum living expenses for one person in 1996
were Won 220,000 (£112.6) (MoHW 1996: 192), which is defined as
official poverty line. The maximum amount of benefits a 65 year-old
person can receive is Won 107,513 (£55.0), which includes old-age
allowance Won 35,000 (£17.9) and supplementary benefits (Won 72,513
(£37.1)) from the Public Assistance Programme, and this makes up only
48.9% of the official poverty line, which is defined in absolute terms. If
we use the relative concept of poverty, this level of benefit falls further
short of alleviating poverty. According to our calculation, which will be
discussed in detail in the next section, one half of the median of
equivalent disposable income in 1996 is Won 348,676.9 (£178.46). The
                                 
6  This figure includes pensioners and survivors within the first-tier and second-
tier old-age pension programmes, but does not include those within disability
and co-ordinated old-age pension programmes. (Ministry of Health and
Welfare 1997)
7 Calculated  from  Korea Statistical Yearbook and Ministry of Health and Welfare
(1997), p.13.9
maximum amount of benefits of a 65 year-old person is 30.9% of the
relative poverty line. Of course, these figures are based on the
assumption that one takes up all benefits available, which is not always
the case.
Table 3: Level of allowances for the elderly in poverty in Korea*
Official poverty line Relative poverty line
220,000 Won 348,676.9 Won
Allowance for age 65-79 48.9% 30.9%
Allowances for age over 80 55.7% 35.1%
Note: * Defined as official poverty line
Source: MoHW (1997 and 1996)
In short, the present public pension system in Korea and one
which is being planned in Taiwan do not secure the pension
entitlements to the current old generations. Only after a considerable
period of time, will pension entitlements be universal in these two
countries. The old-age allowances currently in place also fall far short of
the minimum level of income, even in absolute terms. The answers from
the Korean and Taiwanese governments to this problem are Confucian
solutions. The Korean and Taiwanese welfare system places that
responsibility to a great extent on the elderly themselves and on society,
notably their families. The Korean Welfare Law for the Elderly clearly
states that the main responsibility for supporting elderly people falls on
their children. It also refers to Confucian ethics as the principle for the
welfare policies for the elderly. The Guiding Principles of Social Welfare
Policy adopted by the KMT in Taiwan also made it clear that the family
should be the centre of social policy (Ku 1997: 248). In this area, Japan
joins the ranks. ‘The Japanese-style of welfare society’, which was first
launched by the Prime Minister Ohira in 1979, places great emphasis on
the family. Its main idea is that Japan should not follow the Western
style of welfare state which only caused ‘welfare disease’ (Hashimoto
1979). Instead, Japan needed a welfare system in which the family would
play a key part.
II.2  Family Structure and the Elderly
To what extent is the Confucian solution actually working? Do the
expectations of the East Asian governments reflect the reality? Let us
first look into the family structure of these three societies. Indeed family10
structure in Japan, Korea and Taiwan appears different from that of
other countries such as the US and Denmark. Table 4 indicates that more
than half of elderly people in Korea and Taiwan and a little less than half
in Japan lived together with their grown-up children while most of the
American and Danish elderly lived alone or with only their spouse. To
be sure, such a different family structure does not necessarily confirm
that people in Japan, Korea and Taiwan observe the Confucian ethics.
Grown-up children may live with their old parents due to a whole range
of different reasons. Such a family structure also does not necessarily
imply that elderly members of the family have equal access to family
income. Nevertheless, it seems to be fair to say that the family structure
in Japan, Korea and Taiwan is strongly influenced by the Confucian
ethics. It can also be assumed that the elderly members have some access
to family income, though not necessarily an equal one. It does not,
however, suggest that those elderly people who live with grown-up
children escape from poverty, since the family itself may live in poverty.
In Section III, we will look into how families including elderly members
fare compared to families in general.
Table 4: Structure of elderly households* (1988; in per cent)
One person With spouse With grown-up children Others
Korea  7.7 23.4 65.2  3.7
Japan  6.7 27.2 49.7 16.4
Taiwan** 11.7 14.2 74.1 0.55
US 39.6 40.4 10.4  9.6
Denmark 44.0 46.6  5.1  4.3
Notes: *Households including persons over 60; ** 1986
Source: Korea Survey (Gallup) Polls and Japanese Prime Minster’s Office (1990);
Jacobs (1998).
One other aspect, through which we can see the Confucian
behaviour in terms of supporting elderly people, is the main source of
income for the elderly. Table 5 shows that half of Korean and Taiwanese
elderly people acquire their main income from their children. In
contrast, Japanese elderly people are much less dependent upon their
children. This seems to reflect the fact that the Japanese pension system
is now in full operation, as we have mentioned. In contrast to East Asian
countries, the role of children as main income sources for the elderly in11
the US and Denmark is almost negligible. Instead, the elderly mainly
live on, inter alia, state pensions, earnings and property incomes.
One should, however, notice the change in the trend of the main
income sources over the years in Korea and Taiwan, despite the fact that
public pension systems are not in full operation. (No full pensions are
yet provided except for public employees and teachers.). While income
from earnings has become a main income source for the growing
proportion of elderly people, the role of children has been decreasing
without a strong presence of public pensions. Of course, this must be
related to a whole range of social factors. Nevertheless, Confucian ethics
are weakened, though they remain as a familial arrangement for elderly
people’s welfare in Korea and Taiwan and to a lesser extent in Japan.
Back to our main question, does this familial arrangement secure
the living standards of the elderly? It seems that neither the Confucian
family structure nor such a familial arrangement in themselves
guarantee that elderly people would be free from poverty. What is the
role of the state in securing income for the elderly population? Given
Confucian characteristics among the three East Asian countries in
varying degrees, whether the elderly can escape from poverty is
primarily dependent upon the level of income available to their
households. In other words, we need to analyse the level of income, and
of public and private transfer by different income groups. This will be
addressed issue in the next section
Table 5: Main income sources of the elderly *
Korea Taiwan Japan U.S. Denmark
1981 1988 1994 1986 1993 1981 1988 1988 1988
Earnings 16.2 26.3 37.6 29.8 42.8 31.3 24.5 14.1 10.9
Property 5.5 6.8 6.9 - 1.9 7.4 7.8 19.2 7.3
Private Pension - - 3.9 - - 3.8 1.9 10.4 8.4
Children 72.4 63.7 44.3 67.8 53.2 15.6 9.0 0.2 0.1
State Pension 0.8 1.2 3.5 1.2 1.6 34.9 53.4 53.0 61.2
State Assistance 1.2 1.8 - - 1.2 1.1 0.4 3.0
Others 3.2 0.2 3.8 1.2 0.5 3.1 1.9 2.4 5.7
No answer 0.6 - - - - 2.7 0.4 0.3 3.5
Note: *People over 60
Source: 1981 and 1988: Korea Survey (Gallup Poll) (1990); 1994: Lee et al (1994); for
Taiwan, Director General of Budget (1997b).12
III. Public and Private Income Transfers to Elderly
Households
III.1  Assumptions and Data
Examining empirically the working of Confucian ethics is no easy task,
not only because Confucianism is very complex philosophically, but also
because it is difficult to capture Confucian behaviour in measurable
terms. Because of such difficulties, this article has to make certain
assumptions. It assumes, first, that private income transfers to elderly
households are related to Confucian ethics. Of course, underlying
rationales for private transfers between households are diverse. Sources
of private transfers are also various - not only households but also many
other social institutions, including religious institutions, which may
have no relation to Confucian ethics such as churches. What essentially
matters, however, is that private transfers are income support by society
not by the state. This is the underlying theme that we are interested in,
and that Confucian ethics emphasises.
By elderly households, we mean households, which include at
least one person aged sixty-five or over (in the Korean case, sixty or
over). Such definition requires even stronger assumptions about private
income transfers and Confucian ethics. Can we realistically assume that
private income transfers to households with both young and old
members are related to Confucian values? For example, income transfers
from other households may be earmarked, implicitly or explicitly, for
certain purposes such as education for young members of households.
To loosen the assumption, we will divide elderly households into three
types: first, households including at least one person aged sixty-five or
over; second, couple-only elderly households (where the heads of
households are sixty-five or over); third, single-elderly households (age
sixty-five or over). While the analysis of the first type of households will
give a general picture of private transfers to elderly households, the
second and third type of households will provide test cases regarding
Confucian ethics.
The data sets in this article come from two different sources. The
data set regarding the Korean case is one provided by ‘The National
Survey of Family Income and Expenditure’, which was carried out in 1996
by the National Statistical Office in South Korea. The survey has the
sample of 24,290 households, which represents the whole population.
The analysis of this article is based on micro-data set rather than the
published outcomes. With respect to Taiwan, we used the 1995 data set13
from the archives in the Luxembourg Income Studies. The Taiwanese
data set includes 14,706 households, which represent the whole
population. Because raw data were recorded differently in the micro-
data sets, we have to define a person aged sixty or over for South Korea
and sixty-five or over for Taiwan as an elderly person.
III.2  Private and Public Income Transfers
Table 6 shows the level of private and public transfers to the whole
households in South Korea and Taiwan. Compared to the UK, private
transfers in South Korea and Taiwan are at a higher level, while their
proportion of public transfers is significantly smaller. The level of taxes
in South Korea and Taiwan is also lower than in the UK. Between South
Korea and Taiwan, however, a noticeable difference appears in the level
of public transfers. This must reflect the fact that social expenditure in
Taiwan has increased sharply since 1993 when the Democratic
Progressive Party pressed the government hard on social welfare issues.
In a nutshell, private transfers in South Korea and Taiwan play a
significant role although they do not match the level of public transfers
in the UK with respect to the general population. Back to our main
question, does this level of private transfers secure the standard living of
the elderly?
Table 6: Level of income transfers for all households (%)
Income and Transfers South Korea Taiwan UK
Earnings 95.02 90.72 84.00
Private transfers  4.20  4.00  0.3
Market income 99.20 94.72 84.30
Public transfers  0.78  5.28 15.70





Disposable income 95.66 96.37 78.20
Notes: Market income = private transfers + earnings; Gross income = Disposable
income + tax
1 and social security contributions; 1: Direct Tax
Source: South Korea (1996): National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure;
Taiwan and UK (1995): Luxembourg Income Studies.14
In Tables 7-9, private and public transfers in South Korea (1996)
and Taiwan (1995) are shown according to the decile income groups
based on the whole households. We introduce three measures for the
analysis. First, income level means the proportion of equivalised income
to the half median of the whole households’ equivalised income.8  It
means that one lives in relative poverty if one’s income level is less than
1.00 (income level >=0). Second, by dependency ratio we mean benefits
(equivalised) as a proportion of equivalised income. In other words, a
dependency ratio of 1.00 means that all income of a household comes
from the benefits in question (1>=dependency ratio>=0). Third, relief
ratio, which is benefits in relation divided by the half median of the
whole households’ equivalised income, shows the extent to which the
benefits in relation help a household to escape from relative poverty
(relief ratio>=0). For instance, a relief ratio of more than 1.0 means those
particular benefits alone can help the household escape from the relative
poverty. A relief ratio less than 1.0, therefore, means that one’s
household would be in poverty, if there were no other source of income.
Relief ratio also enables us to compare the level of benefits between
different households.
Table 7 shows private and public transfers to the elderly
households, which include, according to our definition, at least one
elderly person. While public transfers do not play any significant role in
this type of household, private transfers are an important income source,
particularly to the poorest households. However, private transfers fail to
raise the level of income to beyond half the relative poverty line. In this
type of households, 25.6% in Korea and 19.9% in Taiwan live in poverty
in relative terms, while the whole population rates are about ten per cent
(Korea 10.3% and Taiwan 10.1% in relative terms). Since in this type of
households other people as well as elderly persons can live together, we
cannot say much about the nature of private and public transfers. One
thing worth mentioning is that households belonging to the richest
decile have the highest level of social insurance.
                                 
8  Equivalised according to the OECD scale, which is income/(1+(adult-1)*0.7+
children*0.5).15
Table 7: Private and public transfers to households including at least
one elderly person
South Korea
D e c i l e  g r o u p 12 34567891 0
No of households 1383 849 583 500 441 394 345 331 245 325
Percent* 25.6 15.7 10.8 9.3 8.2 7.3 6.4 6.1 4.5 6.0
Income level 0.62 1.13 1.41 1.64 1.87 2.12 2.40 2.80 3.37 5.90
Dependency
ratio
0.53 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 Private
transfer
Relief ratio 0.33 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.28
Dependency
ratio
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 Social
insurance
Relief ratio 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.19
Dependency
ratio
0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 Means test
benefits
Relief ratio 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: (An elderly person = age sixty or over); * Percentage of elderly households
within a decile income group
Source: the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
Taiwan
D e c i l e  g r o u p 1234567891 0
No of households 773 541 461 395 382 324 312 272 244 190
Percent* 19.9 13.9 11.8 10.1 9.8 8.3 8.0 7.0 6.3 4.9
Income level 0.84 1.19 1.43 1.65 1.87 2.13 2.44 2.84 3.49 6.01
Dependency
ratio
0.30 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 Private
transfer
Relief ratio 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.28 0.29
Dependency
ratio
0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 Social
insurance
Relief ratio 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.21
Dependency
ratio
0.19 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 Means test
benefits
Relief ratio 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10
Notes: (An elderly person = age sixty-five or over); * Percentage of elderly
households within a decile income group
Source: Luxembourg Income Studies
Income level = Equivalised income/half median of equivalised income
Dependency ratio=benefits/equivalised income
Relief ratio= benefits/half median of equivalised income16
Table 8 shows private and public transfers to the elderly
households, which comprise only an elderly couple. With respect to the
Korean case, 61% of the income of the poorest groups comes from
private transfers. In terms of relief ratio, the bottom half of these
households score between 0.30 and 0.39. Public transfers, in contrast, do
not play a significant role. Regarding Taiwan, the dependency ratio on
private transfers is lower than in South Korea, while the relief ratios are
at a higher level. In other words, the amount of private transfers is
bigger in Taiwan and at the same time these elderly couple households
have other sources of income. In Taiwan, means-tested public transfers
do contribute to the income of poorer households, although they are at a
lower level than private transfers are.
Table 9 is concerned with the single-elderly households, which
have only one elderly person. In South Korea, 56 per cent of single-
elderly households live in poverty in relative terms, while 36 per cent of
the same type of households in Taiwan live in poverty. With respect to
the elderly households consisting of a couple only, 31.2 per cent (South
Korea) and 31.1 per cent (Taiwan) live in poverty (Table 8), while
households including at least one elderly person fare better. Among
such households, 25.6 per cent in South Korea and 19.9 in Taiwan live in
poverty (Table 7). This suggests that households with elderly persons,
and single-elderly households in particular, are more prone to poverty
than general households, of which about ten per cent live in relative
poverty.
Since the numbers of households in the upper deciles are small, it
is necessary to be cautious in speaking about them. Nevertheless, we can
say more about the poorest groups. In South Korea, the poorest group of
single-elderly households depends mostly on private transfers for their
income, while their Taiwanese neighbours depend equally on private
and public transfers. The relief ratio of private transfers to the poorest
households in South Korea is less than 0.5, which falls far short of the
relative poverty line. This is also the case in Taiwan. However,
Taiwanese elderly people receive public transfers, which makes the
poorest group’s income level 0.83 of the relative poverty line, compared
to South Korea where public transfers to the poorest single-elderly
households receive are almost negligible.
Given such subtle differences between South Korea and Taiwan,
private transfers do make an important contribution to the income of
single- and couple-only elderly households, particularly poorer
households, but they are not substantial enough for poor single- and
couple-only-elderly households to escape poverty. In other words, the17
Confucian proposition, if we assume private transfers are related to that,
is working in the sense that single- and couple-only-elderly households
still get their main income from their families. It does not work in the
sense that it fails to reach the level of the poverty line. In other words,
family help alone cannot maintain the welfare of elderly households. In
this respect, the Taiwanese case suggests an important policy
implication. Although the level of public transfers is still lower than in
the European countries, it makes the income level of poorer single-
elderly and couple-only-elderly household higher than those in South
Korea, where public transfers are almost negligible. Here we should
notice that the Korean old-age allowance seems to have failed to make
an impact although it was extended to people aged 65 or over in 1993.
This failure seems to be due partly to the low level of old-age
allowances, limited eligibility and partly to the low take-up rate of
allowances.18
Table 8: Private and public transfers to elderly households
(couple only)
South Korea
D e c i l e  g r o u p 12345678910
No of households 285 141 83 85 60 45 44 33 35 103
Percent* 31.18 15.43 9.08 9.30 6.56 4.92 4.81 3.61 3.83 11.27
Income level 0.61 1.12 1.40 1.64 1.87 2.12 2.42 2.79 3.37 7.05
Dependency
ratio
0.61 0.35 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.02 Private
transfer
Relief ratio 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.29 0.32 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.15
Dependency
ratio
0.01 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.09 0.23 0.06 Social
insurance
Relief ratio 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.33 0.48 0.26 0.79 0.41
Dependency
ratio
0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 Means test
benefits
Relief ratio 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.02
Note: *Percentage of elderly households within a decile income group
Taiwan
D e c i l e  g r o u p 1234567891 0
No of households 222 118 76 63 46 54 44 30 25 35
Percent* 31.1 16.5 10.7 8.8 6.5 7.6 6.2 4.2 3.5 4.9
Income level 0.83 1.18 1.43 1.66 1.87 2.11 2.42 2.87 3.50 6.71
Dependency
ratio
0.45 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.27 0.06 Private
transfer
Relief ratio 0.37 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.93 0.43
Dependency
ratio
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 Social
insurance
Relief ratio 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.15
Dependency
ratio
0.35 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.02 Means test
benefits
Relief ratio 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.28 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.17
Note: *Percentage of elderly households within a decile income group.19
Table 9: Private and public transfers to single-elderly households
South Korea
D e c i l e  g r o u p 1234567891 0
No of households 549 146 78 35 31 24 22 18 13 17
P e r c e n t * 5 9 1 6 843322 1 12
Income level 0.56 1.14 1.42 1.67 1.85 2.11 2.42 2.83 3.31 6.30
Dependency
ratio
0.72 0.56 0.32 0.58 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.45 Private
transfer
Relief ratio 0.40 0.64 0.45 0.96 0.34 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.56 2.84
Dependency
ratio
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.01 Social
insurance
Relief ratio 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 010 0.31 0.13 0.16 0.08
Dependency
ratio
0.11 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Means
test
benefits Relief ratio 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: (An elderly person = age sixty or over); *Percentage of elderly households
within a decile income group
Source: The National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
Taiwan
D e c i l e  g r o u p 12345678910
No of households 185 74 39 51 45 34 28 20 21 14
P e r c e n t * 3 6 1 4 81 0 975443
Income level 0.83 1.18 1.42 1.66 1.87 2.11 2.47 2.81 3.43 6.68
Dependency
ratio
0.41 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.16 Private
transfer
Relief ratio 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.47 0.34 0.38 0.43 0.54 0.97 1.06
Dependency
ratio
0.08 0.05 0.29 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 Social
insurance
Relief ratio 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.36
Dependency
ratio
0.39 0.36 0.27 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.09 Means test
benefits
Relief ratio 0.32 0.42 0.37 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.15 0.22 0.45
Notes: (An elderly person = age sixty-five or over); *Percentage of elderly
households within a decile income group
Source: Luxembourg Income Studies
Income level=Equivalised income/half median of equivalised income
Dependency ratio=benefits/equivalised income
Relief ratio= benefits/half median of equivalised income20
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this article we have attempted to see to what extent Confucian ethics
are working in terms of income maintenance for the elderly population.
This article divided the elderly households into three types of
households and also decomposed them into decile income groups.
Through such decomposition, it was possible to analyse the level of
private and public transfers in the age- and household-specific sense. It
focused particularly on single- and couple-only-elderly households,
assuming those private transfers to these types of elderly households are
related to Confucian ethics.
Our findings suggest that Confucian ethics is working in the sense
that private transfers contribute to the income of elderly households,
and particularly the poorest single-elderly households, whose income
depends heavily on private transfers. Confucian ethics, however, failed
to secure the living standards of the elderly households in the sense that
the levels of private transfers in most income groups failed to reach the
half of the relative poverty line. It is also worth noting that the
importance of children as the main income source for the elderly has
been weakened.
Compared to private transfers, public transfers in South Korea do
not make any substantial contribution to the income of the elderly
households, while Taiwanese public policy seemed to work better. In
Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party has pressed hard on social
welfare issues, especially pension issues as well as national health
insurance. In the local areas where the DPP took control of local
government, old-age allowances were introduced in 1993, and this
forced the KMT government to make a plan for a national pension
programme. In the South Korean case, although some public policies are
in place, they failed to make any impact on the living standards of the
elderly. Despite some differences between South Korea and Taiwan, the
elderly populations in both countries are more prone to poverty.
This study is not complete in the sense that it was not able to
include the Japanese case in the analysis of income transfers. The
Japanese government does carry out a national income survey every
year but it does not participate in the Luxembourg Income Studies, nor
does it allow researchers access to its micro data set. Since public
pension systems, which have been instituted for a long time in Japan, are
fully matured, the picture would be somewhat different from what we
drew for South Korea and Taiwan, where, in particular, most single-21
elderly households live in poverty (one in two in South Korea and one in
three in Taiwan), and the number of this type of households are rising.
In the wake of an ageing society, East Asian countries are engaged
in social debates on how to deal with such challenges. In South Korea
and Taiwan, there have been social debates on national pension
programmes. In Japan, a couple of ambitious plans for social services for
the elderly (the Gold Plan and the New Gold Plan) have been discussed
for a while in the public arena. These debates are mainly focused on the
long-term projects for the future, in which the current working
generations have their interest at stake. By contrast, what is happening
to the living standards of the current elderly population has attracted
only scant attention from policy makers, and the governments in this
region place emphasis only on Confucian ethics, despite the fact that the
elderly people are far more prone to living in poverty. What should now
urgently be called for is not Confucian ethics but state action for the
elderly. Confucian ethics are still working but it alone cannot work,
while the rapid ageing process in East Asia has put increasing strain on
the family. Of course, in the last decade or so, many welfare institutions
have been introduced in East Asian countries such as a national pension,
old-age allowance and national health insurance. However, they have
not had a great impact as we have seen through this study and there also
seems to be a great deal of room for improvements in efficiency as well
as the need of new public policy.22
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